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Abstract 
Difficulties of behavioral assessment of consciousness. An astonishingly high rate 
of misdiagnosis between vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and mini-
mally conscious state has been detected. This raises the issue of the adequacy of the 
consciousness’ assessment in patients with disorders of consciousness. The behavioral 
assessment of consciousness could be not able to detect covert awareness, which is in-
creasingly identified by the instrumental assessment.
Ancillary methods. Neurotechnology, particularly neuroimaging, provides relevant data 
concerning the neurological underlying condition of patients with DOCs, but the instru-
mental approach has still to assess some technical issues.
Ethical considerations. A correct diagnosis of a DOC is not only an instrumental issue, 
but also an ethically relevant demand to the scientific community. Finally, an integration 
between behavioral and instrumental assessments seems to be the most adequate strat-
egy in order to decrease the rate of misdiagnosis.
INTRODUCTION
New findings in neuroscientific investigation of disor-
ders of consciousness (DOCs) are increasingly leading 
to two results, one theoretical and one practical:
- the development of new diagnostic tools; 
- the development of new therapeutic strategies.
The impact of these results is so relevant to suggest 
a real paradigm shift in the DOCs’ understanding and 
treatment [1]. 
The emerging data potentially raising more thera-
peutic consequences is the evidence that some se-
verely brain damaged patients preserve residual corti-
cal processing even in the absence of behavioral signs 
of consciousness. This possible dissociation between 
neurological state and behavioral evidence suggests the 
clinicians to be cautious in their claims about the con-
sciousness of patients with vegetative state/unrespon-
sive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) [2-4]. 
In fact several studies have shown an astonishingly high 
rate of misdiagnosis between VS/UWS and minimally 
conscious state (MCS), estimated between 30% and 40% 
[5, 6, 2]. One of the reasons of such a high rate of wrong 
diagnosis is the use of nonstandardized consensus-based 
diagnostic techniques in DOCs [7]. This implies that the 
use of systematized scoring systems, whose introduction 
uncovered a lot of misdiagnoses, is mandatory. Anyhow, 
owing to the possible dissociation between behavior and re-
lated neurological condition, even the use of standardized 
behavioral scales may be not sufficient to avoid wrong di-
agnosis. A complementation of behavioral assessment with 
instrumental assessment of consciousness seems the most 
promising strategy to reduce the high rate of misdiagnosis.
This paper aims at: 
- outlining the high rate of misdiagnosis of DOCs 
emerging from the difficulties of the behavioral assess-
ment of consciousness;
- outlining prospects and limitations of the instrumen-
tal assessment of consciousness, particularly its impact 
on the clinical management of patients with DOCs;
- summarizing the ethical issues arising from the mis-
diagnosis between VS/UWS and MCS.
The fundamental idea of the paper is the necessity 
to integrate behavioral and instrumental assessment of 
consciousness in patients with DOCs.
DIFFICULTIES OF BEHAVIORAL 
ASSESSMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The bedside assessment of consciousness is very chal-
lenging and risky. Within the main factors potentially 
affecting the accuracy of behavioral assessment of con-
sciousness there are [8-10]: 
- the presence of underlying deficits in communica-
tion by patients; 
- locked-in syndrome;
- paralysis and akinesia;
- aphasia;
- tracheotomy;
- the use of sedatives;
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- cortical deafness or blindness;
- limited attentional capacities of patients.
Furthermore, it is clinically very challenging to dis-
entangle reflex behavior, which characterizes VS/UWS 
patients, from intermittent voluntary behavior, charac-
teristic of MCS patients [1].
Thus a systematization of behavioral assessment 
scales grounded on a comparative system has been 
necessary. The American Congress of Rehabilitation 
Medicine performed a systematic, evidence-based re-
view of behavioral assessment scales for DOCs and 
provided evidence-based recommendations for clinical 
use founded on content validity (i.e., enclosing diagnos-
tic criteria), reliability, diagnostic validity, and ability to 
predict functional outcomes [11].
The review shows that “the Coma Recovery Scale-
Revised (CRS-R), Sensory Stimulation Assessment 
Measure (SSAM), Wessex Head Injury Matrix 
(WHIM), Western Neuro Sensory Stimulation Pro-
file (WNSSP), Sensory Modality Assessment Tech-
nique (SMART), Disorders of Consciousness Scale 
(DOCS), and Coma/Near-Coma Scale (CNC) have 
acceptable standardized administration and scoring 
procedures. The CRS-R has excellent content validity 
and is the only scale to address all Aspen Workgroup 
criteria. The SMART, SSAM, WHIM, and WNSSP 
demonstrate good content validity, containing items 
that could distinguish persons who are in a vegetative 
state, are in a minimally conscious state (MCS), or 
have emerged from MCS. The Full Outline of UnRe-
sponsiveness Score (FOUR), WNSSP, CRS-R, Com-
prehensive Levels of Consciousness Scale (CLOCS), 
and Innsbruck Coma Scale (INNS) showed substan-
tial evidence of internal consistency. The FOUR and 
the CRS-R showed substantial evidence of good reli-
ability. Evidence of diagnostic validity and prognostic 
validity in brain injury survivor samples had very high 
levels of potential bias because of methodological is-
sues such as lack of rater masking”. 
The conclusion of the review is that a more or less 
significant reservation is necessary for the use of any 
behavioral scale to assess consciousness in patients with 
DOCs. Of course the different scales have different 
rates, that is different abilities to detect residual con-
sciousness. The CRS-R is rated as the best scale which 
can be used with minor reservation; moderate reserva-
tions are suggested for the SMART, WNSSP, SSAM, 
WHIM, and DOCS; major reservation for the CNC, 
while the FOUR, INNS, Glasgow-Liege Coma Scale, 
Swedish Reaction Level Scale-1985, Loewenstein Com-
munication Scale, and CLOCS are not recommended, 
at least for this time.
The reservation to use behavioral scales in the assess-
ment of consciousness suggests their insufficiency for 
an objective diagnosis. The same standardization of the 
behavioral scales caused at the same time the improve-
ment of the diagnosis and the revelation of several cases 
of misdiagnosis. The point is that the behavioral assess-
ment of consciousness is affected by an inner limita-
tion: it is not possible to ascertain what happens in the 
brain from the external behavior, especially in the case 
of DOCs for which a dissociation may exists between 
neurological condition and behavior. 
It is necessary to see over visibility, and this is increas-
ingly possible through neurotechnology [12]. In conclu-
sion, for a more accurate diagnosis it is recommendable 
to integrate the behavioral assessment with ancillary 
technological methods of diagnosis.
ANCILLARY METHODS
Neurotechnology, particularly neuroimaging, pro-
vides relevant data concerning the neurological under-
lying condition of patients with DOCs going beyond 
the dissociation between neurology and behavior.
Neuroimaging studies have been recently used to 
assess patients’ responses to specific external stimuli 
(i.e., command following). Particularly, the assessment 
of consciousness and the new form of communica-
tion allowed by functional Magnetic Resonance Imag-
ing (fMRI) [13] suggest a new diagnostic class, the so 
called ‘functional locked-in syndrome’. This condition 
is used to underlie the state of patients who preserve 
higher cognitive function (such as imagining to play 
tennis or to walk in their house), but are affected by an 
extreme behavioral motor dysfunction [14, 15].
The introduction of the category of functional locked-
in syndrome, such as the suggested use of UWS, is an 
example of the increasing impact of neurotechnology 
on the diagnosis and the nosology of DOCs. The most 
relevant impact of neurotechnology on clinical practice 
is the need for a new nosography. It is relevant that 
many studies regarding VS/UWS were published prior 
to the formal recognition of the diagnostic criteria of 
MCS, so that it is not possible to exclude that the stud-
ied patients were in MCS instead of VS/UWS. It raises 
the practical/clinical problem to properly manage pa-
tients with DOCs, as well as the theoretical issues of 
the validity and accuracy of our actual knowledge.
The study of consciousness at rest is a particularly 
promising application of neuroimaging technology 
[16]. Particularly PET and fMRI identified the so called 
“default mode network”, a set of areas (posterior cingu-
lated/precuneus, anterior cingulated/mesio-frontal cor-
tex, temporo-parietal junctions) which are more active 
at rest than during attention-demanding tasks. This de-
fault mode network is considered to be involved in self-
related processes [17]. It is relevant that resting state 
connectivity disappears in brain death and shows a non-
linear disintegration in pseudocoma or locked-in syn-
drome as compared to minimally conscious or relative 
to unconscious states (VS/UWS or coma). This means 
that monitoring the resting state connectivity through 
neuroimaging can be a new, potentially very accurate 
tool for better diagnosing and managing patients with 
DOCs [18-21].
The spontaneous fMRI activity patterns can serve 
as a useful diagnostic tool in DOCs. Of course, there 
are limits and limitations in the fMRI assessment of 
consciousness, particularly the fact that, given the 
lack of a full understanding of the neural correlates of 
consciousness, even a near-to-normal activation in re-
sponse to passive stimulation cannot be taken as proof 
of preserved awareness, but only as the manifestation 
of the activation of a particular brain region able to ac-
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tivate and process sensory stimulation. Furthermore, 
the non activation during passive fMRI paradigms may 
be consequent to peripheral sensory systems’ impair-
ments (e.g., deafness). Notwithstanding such limita-
tions, as stressed by Soddu et al., “resting-state fMRI 
acquisitions are easy to perform (i.e., do not need au-
ditory, visual or somatosensory stimulation equipment 
in the fMRI environment) and could have a potentially 
broader and faster translation into clinical practice” 
[18]. This does not mean that the clinical application 
of resting state analysis is simple nor unproblematic. In 
fact, there are technical problems still to assess, such 
as spatial normalization, movement correction and how 
to properly assess strongly asymmetric brains in DOC.
The resting state study can be included in the at-
tempts to answer to the need for motor-independent 
signs of awareness derived directly from brain signals 
[22]. A promising preliminary study showed the poten-
tial of resting state structural study to define the prog-
nosis of DOCs and to differentiate between VS/UWS 
and MCS [23]. 
Even in absence of motor responsiveness, functional 
neuroimaging in principle is a more direct and objec-
tive tool to measure residual cognition in severely brain-
damaged patients, but in practice the application of 
functional neuroimaging to patients with DOCs is of-
ten difficult and ambiguous with respect to resolving di-
agnostic uncertainty. For instance the mental activities 
required for detecting and monitoring awareness raise 
a problem of feasibility of consciousness assessment. 
Electrophysiological and neuroimaging protocols have 
been developed to probe for signs of awareness even in 
patients completely unable to move. The main problem 
is that the mental imagery tasks used for MRI detection 
of consciousness require high-order cognitive abilities 
such as comprehending or carrying out instructions and 
can be very demanding for many brain-injured patients. 
On the contrary event-related EEG potentials elicited 
by simpler sensory stimulations involve lower cognitive 
resources. It would be useful to develop more sensitive 
methods of detection independent from the subject’s 
ability to comprehend or carry out instructions [24]. 
The methodology of neuroimaging investigation of 
patients with DOCs may affect also the diagnostic ac-
curacy of the instrumental assessment of the patients. 
There is a real risk of instrumental bias in the assess-
ment of consciousness of patients with DOCs. For in-
stance, in quantitative positron emission tomography 
(PET) studies many assumptions determinate the abso-
lute value of cerebral metabolic rates, and there is not a 
consensus in cases of cerebral pathology. Furthermore 
the variability of corrector factors, such as the lumped 
constant, in cerebrally damaged brains, or metabolically 
inactive spaces of the brain, may artificially lower the 
calculated cerebral metabolism.
Like metabolic studies, even functional studies (such 
as H2
15O-PET, fMRI or magnetoencephalography) 
raise relevant methodological issues: the coupling of 
neural activity and local hemodynamics, which is es-
sential for these studies, in brain damaged patients is 
different than healthy people, so that the interpretation 
of data is very difficult. Moreover the choice of the ap-
propriate experiment (for instance auditory or visual) 
is crucial, as well as the right complexity of the inves-
tigation, which must be complex enough to study the 
cognitive processes of interest but not so complex to 
overload the cognitive capacities of the patient. Other 
relevant practical problems potentially leading to mis-
diagnosis are the frequent episodes of low arousal and 
sleep in patients with DOCs. Even spontaneous move-
ments during the scan may compromise the interpreta-
tion of functional neuroimaging data. Finally, some co-
occurring pathologies, like gross hydrocephalus or focal 
pathology, may complicate the fitting of functional to 
structural imaging data. 
These difficulties do not mean that neurotechnologi-
cal assessment is not feasible or not adequate, but that 
it is necessary to properly manage it in order to obtain 
reliable data. Furthermore the possible uncertainty rais-
ing from instrumental assessment suggests as a proper 
strategy the integration with the behavioral assessment. 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A correct diagnosis of a DOC is not only an instru-
mental issue, but also an ethically relevant demand to 
the scientific community.
One of the reasons for the ethical relevance of a right 
diagnosis between VS/UWS and MCS is their different 
prognosis: the prognosis of the latter is better than the 
prognosis of the former [25-28]. To not adequately di-
agnose a patient with DOC could imply to not properly 
manage and care him, with the consequent not respect-
ing his right to be cared and of his relatives’ and/or his 
legal representative’s right to be adequately informed.
Another ethically relevant reason for developing an 
adequate diagnostic tool for patients with DOCs, par-
ticularly for properly discriminating between VS/UWS 
and MCS, is the potential for pain perception and suf-
fering in the two states: it seems reasonable to assume 
that MCS patients can feel pain and can suffer, while 
VS/UWS patients cannot. This may affect the decision 
regarding clinical treatment, particularly for the use of 
analgesia and painkillers [29]. A wrong diagnosis may 
cause a wrong use of analgesic treatment with poten-
tially negative effects for patients: if the patient is in VS/
UWS and is wrongly diagnosed as in MCS the use of 
painkillers may reduce the residual awareness of the pa-
tients and so leading to diagnostic difficulties; if the pa-
tient is in MCS and is wrongly diagnosed as in VS/UWS 
the clinician may decide to not use painkiller while they 
should be recommendable. 
Finally, the decisions regarding a possible withdrawal 
of life sustaining treatments can be different for VS/
UWS and MCS patients, so that a correct diagnosis is 
crucial for a properly informed decision.
Another socially and ethically relevant phenom-
enon is the increasing request for new diagnostic and 
therapeutic strategies from the family of patients with 
DOCs. In fact, to date some of these new procedures 
remain investigational [30]. Beside the fact that to date 
most of them have not been translated from the labora-
tory to the clinics, some emerging results are still partial 
and waiting for being confirmed. Further studies are 
necessary on this point. The investigational nature of 
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diagnostic and therapeutic strategies requires the clini-
cians to be aware in their conclusion regarding patients’ 
residual consciousness. Furthermore, the necessity of 
specific informed consent and adequate information re-
garding the experimental procedures emerges.
Another relevant point is that the costs of such technol-
ogies may be very high, rising the ethical problems of the 
individual access to them and of the resources’ allocation.
Shortcomings in the media coverage of neuroscien-
tific information lead the risk of unrealistic expectations 
by families and surrogate decision makers [31, 32]. 
This issue is socially and ethically relevant: the clini-
cians have the duty to explain the diagnostic potential 
and limitations of the instrumental assessment of con-
sciousness [30]. 
CONCLUSION
To date consciousness cannot be objectively measured and 
assessed. Even an instrumental estimation of consciousness 
requires an interpretation of several clinical signs. 
In order to avoid a sort of relativism and to develop 
the quantification and standardization of the conscious-
ness’ assessment many scoring systems have been devel-
oped [33]. The main problem is that, since there is not 
a gold standard, criterion validity and diagnostic value of 
the different scoring system cannot be quantified [34]. 
For this reason imaging-based diagnostic methods are 
a recommendable complement of behaviorally based 
assessment in order to avoid diagnostic errors. Comple-
mentation is not substitution: the instrumental assess-
ment is not free of problems of management, analysis 
and interpretation, so that it cannot completely replace 
the standardized clinical assessment.
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